Bangladesh Heritage Foundation


Quick links: content, navigation, search.



Normative Trends, Values, And Bangladesh Foreign Policy: A Framework

Ambassador Wali-ur Rahman

“We he have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. (Emphasis added.) Lord Palmerston, (Henry John Temple, 1784-1865) 3rd Viscount, 1848.

These forthright and prophetic words of Lord Palmerston dating back about a century and a half had placed the essence of a country’s foreign policy destiny. Time has changed, so has process and structure of decision making, and even the nature of the international system itself has changed; but the focus or motivation of foreign policy decision making has not. It is appropriate to mention that Palmerston’s foreign office had about 50 staff members, a hundred year later George Brown was presiding over a foreign office with a staff hundred-fold more than in Palmerston’s time. Across the Atlantic, when. Thomas Jefferson took over as the First Secretary of State in 1790, the U.S. State Department had eight employees, two diplomatic missions and ten consular posts. If one compares the current diplomatic setup in either of the two countries with the old one can imagine how complex and wide-ranging foreign policy establishment has emerged in either of these countries.

Foreign policy of any country is a process of evolution, since ninety per cent of the time foreign policy is, as Henry Kissinger put it, “a trend, not a hot item”. Treaty obligations cannot be abandoned. Even lesser commitments undertaken by one government cannot be lightly set aside by its successor. Being a member of international organizations requires a government to keep paying its dues, political and financial[1]. Being a new nation-state Bangladesh is yet to familiarize itself with the complex nature of the international system, which provides the base and context of foreign policy decision making. Touching on a few specific antecedents and current issues, the article suggests some ideas which may form the basis of a framework for more thoughtful reflection by our policy makers and others concerned in the framing of our external policy.

I. Background

The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent nation, the l36th member of the United Nations, carried with it an important meaning not so much in terms of the political architectonic, as in the fact of ideological moorings.

 

The preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh passed by the constituent Assembly of Bangladesh on November 4, 1972 stated, “We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our Independence on the 26th day of March 1971, and, through a historic struggle for national liberation, established the independent, sovereign People’s Republic of Bangladesh [2].  In 1977 by proclamation order No.1 the phrase “a historic struggle for national liberation” was replaced with, “a historic war for national independence” [3]. Does this represent any basic divide in national ideology? Perhaps not, for the change at best represents a regime dimension or an act by a new regime in its search for legitimacy in the changed context of national politics.

 

If foreign policy of a country is the reflection of its domestic policy – as we have already seen with regard to the policies of the two old functioning democracies of the world – the lack of consensus in the approach of our policy makers demonstrates the difficulty of our leaders in agreeing on an irreducible minimum for giving expression to our national aspirations in consonance with the zeitgeist of the country.

 

The struggle of national independence of Bangladesh was not only a struggle for the emancipation of a people: it was a struggle for the preservation of democratic human values and rediscovering the cultural soul which were trampled under foot by an undesired military authoritarianism which successively imposed itself Upon a hapless people[4].

 

Love for the land and love for the people who inhabit this land, and love for the language and culture and the people of this land – these are the feelings which form the bedrock of the new nationalism of today in Bangladesh [5].

 

Why then our inability till today, to find a common ground? Foreign policy in any country is an extension of domestic policy. Bangladesh should offer no exception to this. In British political system the Labour and Conservative parties may disagree on the modality of implementation of policies, with difference of emphasis, but there is hardly any divergence of views on the basic policy objectives o their foreign perceptions of national interest which determine their foreign policy objective and its projection, are almost indistinguishable. In our country such a perceptual convergence is still pre-eminently missing.

 

II. Search for Mindset

As in domestic politics so in foreign policy of any country history and historical experience plays a most dominant role. If we have yet not been able to conceive of a proper foreign policy objective it is not because of lack of our political commitment or patriotism. Regardless of differing political orientations of the major parties of the country they all realize that we have only one country and one flag.

 

If we take a deeper look into history of what was India our ability to understand the present and still prevailing doubts about the nature of our statecraft, secular, non-secular or Islamic will become clearer. The War of Independence was fought on the basis of a secular philosophy, telling the world that religion alone could not be the basis of a state. The military-bureaucratic combine of Pakistan got a rude shock when the Bengali nation rose as one man and at the cost of three million martyrs made the surrender of the Pakistan Army on December 1971 possible. The Muslim countries, excepting Iraq and Egypt, did not recognize Bangladesh for a long time. The Saudi Arabian recognition of Bangladesh on 16 August 1975 was quickly followed by other conservative Islamic countries. Efforts were then made to give an Islamic orientation to our foreign policy. But if we try to find Bengali Muslim mindset in history it will be easier for us to recognize what ought to be our foreign policy objectives.

 

Along with the existence of the civilizations of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa we know of similar civilizations in the Sutlej valley in Rajsthan, in Ahmedabad and also in area what now constitutes North Bengal. In the scale of civilization the Aryans were perhaps inferior to the people of Mohenjo Daro, but their more aggressive character and their superiority in the art of warfare gave them the victory [6]. The fact that Bengalese as a race with predominance of the dark pigmen- tation of the Dravidians played an important role in the statesmanship of the Aryans to conceive both Rama and Krishna as dark in complexion proves or goes to prove the importance of the Bengali race in the past history of India. Chandragupta Maurya, whose empire stretched from Afghanistan to the borders of Bengal, received envoys from foreign Kings and Potentates as reported by Megasthenes, the Greek historian. According to legend, Alexander took away with him numerous Indian scholars, including those of Bengali origin, at the behest of Aristotle, who wanted to learn more about the Indian solution to the problems of metaphysics. It is interesting to note that around 78 A.D. Kanishka, a Buddhist, with capital in Purusha-pura or modern Peshawar, used a dress which corresponds to the achkan and pajama we use even till today in Bengal and other major parts of India.

 

Although Sind became a part of the Caliphate of Baghdad in 712 A.D., there was a Muslim attack on Thana, near Bombay as early as 637 A.D. Alauddin Khilji, regarded as the first Muslim Emperor of India (1296), was at times more harsh with the Muslims than with the Hindus. Of the six score or more battles fought in India, between 711 A.D. to 1700 A.D., more than half were clashes amongst Muslims. Like the Muslims, initially the Europeans came to India at the lure of wealth. The British ultimately succeeded because of their superior organization and lack of unity in the local principalities.

 

As in any civilization, in Indian subcontinent, too, the civilization that we have inherited, first in India, then in Bengal, and then in Bangladesh, can be termed as an Aryan synthesis. In case of India that culture is almost as extensive as civilization itself. In this connection, we have seen that Hinduism had in it an ascetic and other worldly phase. Islam, on the other hand, was non-ascetic and centered upon this world in a conception of life which was vital, Organic and social. The younger faith challenged the assumptions of the old and shook its social structure to the very foundation [7].

III. Synthesis of the Old and New

In ancient India the higher civilization of the pre-Aryans suffered military defeat at the hands of the invading Aryan hordes, but in time transformed Aryan mentality itself by enriching the cultural life of the conquerors. We have learned from history that the Macedonean civilization was defeated but the result was a higher Hellenic culture. The same phenomenon can be noticed in the cultural conquest by Greece. Back home in India the Muslim victory resulted in the synthesis and reconciliation of two great cultures: the emergence of Ramananda and Kabir, Nanak, Chaitanya and Moinuddin Chisty is the outcome. As many historians agree, the growth of vaishnavism in Bengal can be attributed to be fusion of these two great cultures.

 

This historic background brings into relief, as mentioned earlier, the paradox faced by us today. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, no doubt spoke of a ‘Two Nation Theory’ in support of a homeland for the Muslims, but his perception of Pakistan was based on a vision of a secular country. To quote Jinnah’s famous words expressed shortly after partition of India in 1947: ‘The Hindus ceased to be Hindus the Muslims ceased to be Muslims – we all Pakistani’. It is a pity he did not live long enough to see a secular structure being built on the state he had pioneered. The Aryan synthesis to which the Muslims of India made a glorious contribution was too uncomfortable for the British. The Hindu-Muslim difference was actually a creation of the British to serve their ulterior purpose. As Sir John Strachey writing in 1888 observed, the “truth plainly is that the existence side by side, of these hostile creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India”.

 

IV. Making of Bangladesh Foreign Policy

We may perhaps claim that we consolidated our independence and sovereignty within three years of achieving independent nationhood and succeeded in the withdrawal of foreign troops from Bangladesh. We also signed a water treaty with India securing 44,000 cusecs of Ganges water for the country. Then Bangladesh was elected a member of the Security Council in 1978 by defeating an economic giant like Japan. But we still remain hesitant in many areas of our policy projections. Palpable failure of our bureaucracy resulted in the disastrous outcome in our bid to get the top FAO post in November 1993. The dichotomy is also noticed when we read the declarations of major political parties on our foreign policy.

A dispassionate study of our heritage and history will help us not only in understanding our nationhood, but also pointing out the fact that our culture is monistic. The more we appreciate this the better for our foreign policy decision makers and the people at large. If foreign policy means the creation of convenience for our country in another country then we can easily agree with Palmerston that we can only pursue our policy for promoting our permanent interest. And this will mean that in today’s world democracy to be institutionalized in Bangladesh for which Bengali genius is overwhelmingly suited, we must create conditions for our diplomats to have a free hand in promoting country’s interest in economic, cultural and other areas of interest. Diplomacy is, after all, the first line of defence. This will also mean that we cannot base our policy only on the argument of realpolitik. The French tried it, but it led to Vichy regime of Marshall Petain. The Popinjay diplomacy of Dr. Wen was realistic: it has led to one of the worst genocides of this century in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Americans have always come up front in diplomatic arena world-wide because of their policy of moral underpinning in any diplomatic initiative. With some exception the Americans have always stood firm and taken the side of what Italian Philosopher, Benedetto Croce stated, the morally correct position of state policy and this ultimately succeeds.

 

V. Recent Historical Input

If we have a look at the last one hundred years of the growth of Bengali spirit, we find some very interesting elements. Although for example in 1895 the British Raj really established its omphalos in India, the Bengalese registered their serious dissatisfaction through the revolts of fakirs and sannyasis which continued for about 40 years. This was accompanied by peasant revolts, Wahabi movement, farazi resistance and other spiritual movements, Sepoy revolution and the revolts of the Indigo planters against the British Raj. Towards the beginning of this century in 1905 the partition of Bengal was effected by Lord Curzon and this triggered off the Swadeshi movement against the British. In 1906 Muslim League was established in Dhaka to ventilate the particular grievances of the Muslim community.

In 1920 Moulana Mohammad Ali and Moulana Showkat Ali started the Khilafat Movement. Later on in the Khilafat Convention held in Bombay the proposals of Moulana Abul Kalam Azad for Disobedience Movement and Mahatma Gandhi’s Satyagraha Movement were unanimously adopted. In 1930 the occupation and destruction of Chittagong armory armed Bengali revolutionaries led by Masterda Surjya Sen, combined with the subsequent and even more daring strategic undertakings of Netaji Subhas Chandra. Bose added new chapters to the efforts of the Bengalese in this part of the world to establish their identity and persona. All these are part of our legacy. There is no way we can disown them.

On February 23 1948 in the first session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, a proposal was made by Dhirendranath Dutt to recognize BangIa, together with Urdu and English, as one of the languages of the country but the demand was rejected by the then leaders of Pakistan. The rest of the history of Bangla, search for a cultural identity and the struggle for Bangladesh is too well known to be repeated here. But the history of our recent past as well as of the remote period should guide us in our search for a synthesis.

VI. Principle of Higher Good

The legacy of the Aryan synthesis followed by the experiences under the British Raj, the ‘internal colonial’ legacies of the Pakistani regimes and the brutalities of the period of liberation struggle have lent the people of Bangladesh a unique experience. They perhaps also work as a pathfinder. The difficulties we have in various areas of our endeavors can be, to a great extent, redressed if we pay heed to the experience and revolution of the Bengali persona through history. As a nation-state we have additional responsibilities and liabilities. The first principle that comes to mind is the well-known dictum – that you can replace your cycle, buy a new automobile, you can even change your wife if you so desire but you cannot change your neighbor. Hugo Grotious had perhaps this in mind when he wrote in his preface to the Law of War and Peace... “once arms were taken up, all respect for divine and human law was thrown aside, as if men were thereafter, authorized to commit all crimes without restraint” [8].

 

The message is very clear and unambiguous. We have no desire to be at loggerhead with our neighbors. But it has to be reciprocal. We have Just celebrated the decade of the formal launching of SAARC comprising countries of South Asia. We promoted the regional idea to signal our peaceful intention to our neighbors. Let us remain committed to this course. Until and unless we learn to accept this essential element of the existence of nation-state in our neighborhood we will find it very hard to reconcile our conflicting views on what is good for each one of us. An agreement on the irreducible minimum is possible if we pay heed to our past history and without that no credible progress, economic, social or otherwise is possible. ASEAN needed this, so did the European Union. There is no reason why we shall fail.

 

VII. Foreign Policy Virtues

The search for virtue in the Western world had its origins in ancient Greece and Rome where the terms ARETE and VIRTU embodied valor, courage, chivalry, manliness, fortitude, loyalty, rectitude and excellence. Perhaps the word magnanimity comes closer any other to these connotations [9]. We all remember the history of the destruction of Melos, an independent city state, by the Athenians as told by Thucydides.

 

Machiavelli formulated the Reason of State in his ‘The Prince’ as the ‘be all and end all’ of all that is needed for the good of the country, but his concern was not with morals but with power and success of his Prince.

 

The philosophy of Reason of State along with Reason of Faith was indiscriminately used during the Renaissance and Reformation. It dictated the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews from Spain by the monarchs who presided over the discovery of America. In the New World it justified the near termination of the natives of the Caribbean Islands, Mexico, and Peru because they were heathens. It justified too, in 16th century France the St. Bartholomew massacre and the destruction or expulsion of the remaining Huguenots [10].

 

The wars of dynasties are over, so are the wars of empires. Religious wars persist in some areas but on the whole they will also become a thing of the past. In its place ultra nationalism should not be allowed to strike roots. Certain doses of the philosophy of enlightenment are always helpful.  As this will help us to think more regionally, perhaps globally than from the strict nationalistic point of view.  Nation-states, like individuals, need utopia, even if to live with high vision.  

 

In today’s Bangladesh our legacy must playa role, since this will help us understand our problems and future requirements better and resolution of problems afflicting us will become easier. We cannot do otherwise. We can do so only at our own peril. Remember what Henry Kissinger said: “Once a great nation commits itself, it must prevail. It will acquire no kudos for transmitting its inner doubts into hesitation”. As we moved through the ages from past history to the current we naturally committed ourselves to a certain course of values and ideals. Let us stand by them and work toward building a new destiny for ourselves as well as for the rest of South Asia.


References

1.   Cited in John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office (London: Chapman's Publishing, 1922).
2.   The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, passed by the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh, November 4, 1972.
3.   The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.-1991, as amended upto October 10.
4.   A.F. Salauddin Ahmed. Bangladesh: Tradition and Transformation (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 1987).
5.   Ibid, p. 90.
6.   Humayun Kabir, The Indian Heritage (New York.. Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 3.
7.   Ibid, p. 75. 8. Ibid. p. 81.
8.   Sir John Strachey, India, its administration and progress (London: Macmillan, 1,903), p. 225.
9. Henry Steel Commager, Ethics and International Relations (Edited by Kenneth W. Thompson), (Oxford and New Brunswick, Published for the Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1890).
10.  Ibid.

 

 

Ambassador Wali-ur Rahman : Former Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chairman, Bangladesh Heritage Foundation. Member, International Instt. of Strategic Studies (IISS). Visiting Fellow, QEH, Oxford, 1993-94.




Ambassador Wali-ur Rahman

Plates